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Comments

Dialing "M" for Murder: Analyzing the Admissibility
of the Telephone Dying Declaration
A Bradford County Court of Common Pleas jury convicted Terry
Ray Chamberlain ("Chamberlain") of two counts of first degree
murder, burglary, and possession of an instrument of crime.' The
convictions arose from the shooting deaths of Chamberlain's
estranged wife, Sherri Chamberlain, and her boyfriend, Gregory
Inman.2 At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury found aggravating
circumstances, but no mitigating circumstances, and fixed the
death penalty for the first degree murder convictions. 3 The trial
court formally imposed sentence and denied Chamberlain's motions
for a new trial and post-trial and post-sentence relief. 4 Chamberlain
appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania as of right,
pursuant to 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. section 744(4).5
1. Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, No. 155 Capital Appeal Docket (E.D. Pa 1997), Brief
for Appellee at 4; Brief for Appellant at 12-13.
2. Chamberlain,Brief for Appellee at 5; Brief for Appellant at 14.
3. Chamberlain, Brief for Appellee at 4; Brief for Appellant at 13. The jury
unanimously found two aggravating circumstances: (1) Chamberlain committed a killing
while in the perpetration of a felony (42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9711(d)), and (2) Chamberlain
had been convicted of another murder committed either before or at the time of the offense
at issue (42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9711(d)(11)). Chamberlain,Brief for Appellee at 4.
4.
Chamberlain,Brief for Appellee at 5; Brief for Appellant at 14.
5.
Chamberlain,Brief for Appellee at 3; Brief for Appellant at 11. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. section 744(4) provides, in part:
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of
the courts of common pleas in the following cases: ...
(4) Automatic review of sentences as provided by 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9546(d)
(relating to relief and order) and 9711(h) (relating to review of death sentence).
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 744(4). Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. section 9711(h) provides:
(h) Review of death sentence (1) A sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme
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Of the sixteen issues on appeal,6 whether the trial court erred in
Court of Pennsylvania pursuant to its rules.
(2) In addition to its authority to correct errors at trial, the Supreme Court
shall either affirm the sentence of death or vacate the sentence of death and
remand for further proceedings as provided in paragraph (4).
(3) The Supreme Court shall affirm the sentence of death unless it determines
that:
(i) the sentence of death was the product of passion, prejudice or any
other arbitrary factor, or
(ii) the evidence fails to support the finding of at least one aggravating
circumstance specified in subsection (d)
(iii) Deleted.
(4) If the Supreme Court determines that the death penalty must be vacated
because none of the aggravating circumstances are supported by sufficient
evidence, then it shall remand for the imposition of a life imprisonment
sentence. If the Supreme Court determines that the death penalty must be
vacated for any other reason, it shall remand for a new sentencing hearing
pursuant to subsections (a) through (g).
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(h).
6.
In addition to the telephone dying declaration issue, Chamberlain appealed the
following fifteen issues:
1. Whether the evidence provided at trial was sufficient or insufficient to support
the verdict?
2. Whether the trial court properly or erroneously denied a motion for a new trial
on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence?
3. Whether the trial court properly or erroneously concluded that the prosecutor's
closing argument did not include unduly prejudicial personal assertions of guilt or
inferential conclusions that were not supported by the evidence?
4. Whether the trial court properly or erroneously concluded that there was no due
process violation in the failure of the police to preserve certain evidence where the
alleged exculpatory nature of the lost evidence was not facially apparent and where
there is no evidence that the police acted in bad faith?
5. Whether the trial court properly or erroneously denied a defense continuance
request?
6. Whether it was constitutionally permissible or impermissible to allow
prosecutors discretion in determining whether a death penalty should be sought in a
given case; and whether relief from the death penalty is warranted under Section
9711(h) of the Judicial Code?
7. Whether the trial court properly or erroneously concluded that the
Commonwealth did not withhold any exculpatory or material evidence?
8. Whether the trial court properly or erroneously denied a motion for a new trial
on the ground of after-discovered evidence?
9. Whether the trial court properly or erroneously denied a motion to dismiss the
Criminal Information based on allegations of vindictive prosecution?
10. Whether the trial court properly or erroneously admitted evidence of prior bad
acts?
11. Whether the trial court properly or erroneously denied Chamberlain's motions
for mistrial?
12. Whether the trial court properly or erroneously denied a motion to quash the
Criminal Information based on an alleged violation of the Commonwealth's Attorney's
Act?
13. Whether the trial court properly or erroneously denied a motion to dismiss the
Criminal Information based on legal insufficiency and failure to establish a prima facie
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admitting the hearsay testimony of Kim Ulrich under either the
dying declaration or the excited utterance exception to the hearsay
rule when the declarant allegedly made the statement via telephone
raises an important and interesting question - whether a telephone
dying declaration can ever (or should ever) rise to the level of
trustworthiness inherently necessary for admission into evidence.
Although the elements of the dying declaration and excited
utterance exceptions differ, the resolution of the telephone dying
declaration question under the facts presented in Chamberlain
necessarily resolves the excited utterance issue. Therefore, this
Comment primarily focuses on the dying declaration question. Part
A reviews the relevant evidence presented at Chamberlain's jury
trial that resulted in his conviction. Part B outlines the hearsay rule
and the rationales underlying its exceptions, specifically the dying
declaration exception. Part C proposes a rationale for deciding the
dying declaration issue under the facts presented in Chamberlain.
Part D analyzes whether a telephone dying declaration can ever, or
should ever, rise to the level of trustworthiness inherently
necessary for admission into evidence.
PART

A- COMMONWEALTH V. CHAMBERLAIN. THE ThRAL EVIDENCE

Terry Lee Chamberlain's estranged wife, Sherri Chamberlain, and
her boyfriend, Gregory Inman, were found dead at their Bradford
County, Pennsylvania, residence in the early morning hours of
August 22, 1991. 7 Each victim died of multiple gunshot wounds. 8
The trial court permitted, over objection, the hearsay testimony
of Kim Ulrich under either the dying declaration or excited
utterance exception to the hearsay rule. 9 Accordingly, Mrs. Ulrich
case at the preliminary hearing?
14. Whether the trial court properly or erroneously denied a request for all
investigating grand jury testimony prior to the commencement of trial?
15. Whether a criminal defendant is entitled to relief on the basis of allegations of
prosecutorial intimidation of witnesses?
See Chamberlain,Brief for Appellee at 1; Brief for Appellant at [1].
7. Chamberlain,Brief for Appellant at 14.
8. Chamberlain,Brief for Appellee at 8; Brief for Appellant at 14.
9. Chamberlain, Brief for Appellee at 9; Brief for Appellant at 15. "A statement may
be considered a dying declaration and, therefore, admissible hearsay if, at the time of the
statement, the declarant believes he is going to die, death is imminent and death actually
results." Commonwealth v. Miller, 417 A.2d 128, 132 (Pa- 1980); Commonwealth v. Frederick,
498 A.2d 1322, 1324 (Pa. 1985). See also Part C infra.
[An excited utterance may be defined as a spontaneous declaration by a person
whose mind has been suddenly made subject to an overpowering emotion caused by
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testified that she received a telephone call on August 22, 1991 that
awakened her at 2:24 a.m. 10 She then testified that after she
answered the telephone, the caller stated: "Call an ambulance Terry shot Greg and me.""
Mrs. Ulrich also testified that she recognized the caller's voice as
Sherri Chamberlain's, her friend and neighbor with whom she
spoke on the telephone more than 100 times that year.12 Mrs. Ulrich
further testified that she engaged in many conversations with Sherri
Chamberlain regarding Ms. Chamberlain's estranged husband and
that the victim always referred to him as "Terry."13 Mrs. Ulrich
described the tone of the caller's voice as urgent, trembling, and
very clear. 14 Mrs. Ulrich's testimony further revealed that the
telephone call endured for approximately 2.5 seconds, during which
time Mrs. Ulrich heard no background noises. 15 In addition, Mrs.
Ulrich testified that the caller failed to respond to her queries of,
6
"Sherri?"'1
Following the call, Mrs. Ulrich told her husband, Vaughn, that
Chamberlain just shot Sherri Chamberlain and Greg Inman.17 Mrs.
Ulrich then called 911 and told the dispatcher that Chamberlain
8
shot her neighbors.'
Vaughn Ulrich immediately dressed and proceeded to the victims'
residence where he discovered their bodies approximately three
minutes after the call.'9 Mr. Ulrich testified that he heard no
gunshots while en route to the victims' home.20 He also stated that
when he arrived at the victims' residence, he did not see or hear
21
anyone exit.

some unexpected and shocking occurrence, which that person has just participated in
or closely witnessed, and made in reference to some phase of that occurrence which
he perceived, and this declaration must be made so near the occurrence both in time
and place as to exclude the likelihood of its having emanated in whole or in part from
his reflective faculties.
Commonwealth v. Cooley, 348 A.2d 103, 106 (Pa 1975) (quoting Allen v. Mack, 28 A.2d 783

(1942)).
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Chamberlain,Brief for Appellee at 8; Brief for Appellant at 14.
Chamberlain,Brief for Appellee at 6; Brief for Appellant at 15.
Chamberlain,Brief for Appellee at 7.
Id.
Id.
Chamberlain,Brief for Appellant at 20.
Id. at 23.
Chamberlain,Brief for Appellee at 7.
Id.; Chamberlain,Brief for Appellant at 16.
Chamberlain,Brief for Appellee at 7.
Chamberlain,Brief for Appellant at 15.
Id. at 21.
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Additional testimony revealed that the lower portion of Sherri
Chamberlain's body was found on the living room floor; the upper
portion was found on the steps leading upstairs to the kitchen,
bathroom and bedrooms. 22 Next to Sherri Chamberlain's body
rested the handset of a wall-mounted telephone. 23 Following the
arrival of Pennsylvania State Troopers and the coroner, the coroner
used the victims' telephone, thus destroying any evidence that
could have been obtained from the redial function. 24
The Commonwealth's medical expert testified that Sherri
Chamberlain sustained five gunshot wounds, including a grazing
scalp wound, a chest wound, a shoulder wound, an abdominal
wound and a head wound. 25 The expert further testified that Sherri
Chamberlain's head wound was immediately fatal and her chest
wound would have killed her within a few seconds to a couple of
26
minutes, at most.

A forensic examination of the scene revealed no physical
evidence linking Terry Chamberlain to the murders. 27 The
Commonwealth produced no eyewitnesses and no murder
28
weapon.
22.
Chamberlain,Brief for Appellee at 7.
23. Id. at 7-8.
24.
Chamberlain,Brief for Appellant at 16.
25.
Chamberlain,Brief for Appellee at 9.
26.
Chamberlain,Brief for Appellant at 21 and n.l.
27. Id. at 14, 23.
28.
Id. at 14, 16. The Commonwealth grounded its case against Chamberlain on the
following circumstantial evidence:
Stanley Mullen, Chamberlain's co-worker, testified that Chamberlain expressed
dissatisfaction that his estranged wife took up residence with another man and that he was
forced to pay child support. Chamberlain, Brief for Appellee at 5. Mullen also testified that
Chamberlain approached him in search of purchasing a handgun, specifically an unregistered
.357 or .38 caliber. Id.
Another co-worker, James Janowsky, testified that he and Chamberlain engaged in
conversations approximately 17 months before the murders wherein Janowsky told
Chamberlain of an unnamed acquaintance who assisted him with his marital problems by
arranging to have a person visit Janowsky's wife's boyfriend to convince him to stop seeing
Janowsky's wife. Id. at 6. Janowsky also testified that he told Chamberlain the unnamed
individual was willing to have someone put a pilow over Janowsky's wife's head or slap her
around a bit. Id. Janowsky stated that Chamberlain became keenly interested in meeting
Janowsky's acquaintance, asked Janowsky about contacting the person and that Chamberlain
did not desist until Janowsky told him that person no longer provided such services. Id.
An attorney testified regarding his review of documents filed in Chamberlain's divorce. Id.
The attorney stated that Sherri Chamberlain would have become eligible to obtain a no-fault
divorce on the day of the murders. Id.
A Pennsylvania State Trooper testified that he telephoned Chamberlain twice on the
morning of the murders. Id. at 8-9. Tapes of these telephone caUs were captured on
audiotape by Chamberlain's answering machine and played for the jury. Id. at 9.
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A jury convicted Terry Lee Chamberlain of two counts of first
degree murder, burglary, and possessing an instrument of crime
and fixed the death penalty for the first degree murder
convictions.2 9 Following formal imposition of sentence, the trial
court denied Chamberlain's motions for a new trial and for
post-trial and post-sentence relief. 0 As a matter of right,
31
Chamberlain appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
PART B: THE

HEARSAY

RULE,

RATIONALES FOR EXCEPTIONS, EMPHASIZING
32

THE DYING DECLARATION EXCEPTION

"Hearsay" is defined as an out-of-court statement offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.m Any statement, except one
made by a witness testifying at trial, constitutes an out-of-court
statement.M A hearsay statement may be a written or oral
communication. 35 Written communications include reports, letters,
records and computer printouts.3 6 Oral communications include
Chamberlain's voice appeared alert and unemotional. Id. He exhibited no sign of surprise or
curiosity from the phone call he received from a police officer at 4:00 am. He also failed to
question police directions to leave his house with his hands in view. Id.
Another Pennsylvania State Trooper testified that Chamberlain exited his home dressed in
a pair of shorts. Id. The trooper further testified that Chamberlain was meticulously clean
and smelled of shampoo, deodorant and soap. Id. He stated that Chamberlain's hair was
damp at the roots and that he appeared to have been awake when police arrived at his
home. Id.
29.
Chamberlain,Brief for Appellee at 4; Brief for Appellant at 12-13.
30.
Chamberlain,Brief for Appellee at 4; Brief for Appellant at 13-14.
Chamberlain,Brief for Appellee at 3; Brief for Appellant at 11.
31.
32.
Unlike the Federal Rules of Evidence, which are the product of legislative action,
the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence were, at the time the instant decision was rendered, a
product of the common law. On April 1, 1998, however, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
codified the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, effective October 1, 1998.
33.
See Semieraro v. Commonwealth Equip. Corp., 544 A.2d 46, 47 (Pa. 1988);
Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 462 A-2d 270, 272 (Pa. Super. 1983); Commonwealth v. Darden,
457 A.2d 549, 551 (Pa. Super. 1983).
Hearsay evidence is testimony in court of a statement made out of the court, the
statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein,
and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter.
Evidence not proceeding from the personal knowledge of the witness, but from the
mere repetition of what he has heard others say. That which does not derive its value
solely from the credit of the witness, but rests mainly on the veracity and competency
of other persons. The very nature of the evidence shows its weakness, and, as such,
hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible unless it falls within one of the many
exceptions which provides for admissibility.
BLAcI's LAW DICnONARY 722 (6th ed. 1990).
34.
PACKEL & POUN, PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE, § 801 at 542 (1987).
35. Id. § 801 at 541.
36. Id.
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face-to-face communications, telephone communications and
recordings of these communications. 37 When a proponent of an
out-of-court statement offers it to prove the facts communicated in
the statement, the proponent offers the statement for the truth of
the matter asserted.38
Generally, hearsay is inadmissible at trial because hearsay
statements lack the judicial guarantees of trustworthiness provided
by an oath and cross-examination. 39 However, four reasons justify
the creation of various exceptions to the general rule excluding
hearsay: necessity, convenience or efficiency, fairness and inherent
guarantees of trustworthiness. 4°
41
Necessity usually arises due to the unavailability of the witness.
A witness is "unavailable" if he is dead, insane, beyond the reach of
a summons, holds a privilege permitting him to refuse to testify or
is otherwise unavailable to testify.4
Convenience or efficiency encompasses what is just and suitable
to be adequate in producing a properly desired effect.4 As this
often occurs in the context of admitting business records", the
Pennsylvania legislature enacted the Uniform Business Records of
Evidence Act.45 The rationale behind the statute is that, in today's
multifaceted business world, a requirement that the entrant of the
business record possess personal knowledge of the event recorded,
and a requirement of proof of the identity of the recorder would
exclude most evidence regarding the activities of large business.4
37. Id.
38. Id. at 542; see also Cassidy, 462 A.2d at 272.
39. Commonwealth v. Smith, 681 A.2d 1288 (Pa. 1996); see also Heddings v. Steele, 526
A.2d 349, 351 (Pa. 1987).
40. PACKEL & PouuN, supra note 34, § 803 at 557.
41. Id. at 557-58.
42. See BLACK'S LAW DIcnoNARY 1523 (6th ed. 1990); PACKEL & POUUN, supra note 34,
§ 804; JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1421 at 253 (Chadbourne rev. ed.
1974).
43.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "convenient" as "[P]roper, just; suitable; fit;
adapted; proper, becoming appropriate." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 330 (6th ed. 1990). Black's
Law Dictionary defines "efficient" as "[c]ausing an effect; particularly the result or results
contemplated. Adequate in performance or producing properly a desired effect." Id. at 515.
44. PACKEL & POuLN, supra note 34, § 803 at 558.
45.
"A record of an act, condition or event shall, insofar as relevant, be competent
evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of
its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business at or near the time of
the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the tribunal, the sources of information,
method and time of preparation were such as to justify its act." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6108 (1984 & West Supp. 1997) ("Uniform Business Records of Evidence Act").
46. Fauceglia v. Harry, 185 A.2d 598, 600 (Pa. 1962).
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"Fairness" is evenhandedness and equality between conflicting
interests. 47 Fairness typically arises in the context of prior
admissions made by an accused because it is considered fair that a
party's previous incriminating statements be used against him if
they are inconsistent with his trial position.4
The final rationale for excepting statements from the hearsay
rule becomes operative when the circumstances attendant to the
hearsay statement provide sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness
that render unnecessary the normal judicial assurances of an oath
and cross-examination. 49 Three justifications support this rationale:
(1) the circumstances are such that a sincere and accurate
statement would naturally be uttered, and no plan of falsification is
formed; (2) even though a desire to fabricate might present itself,
other considerations, including the danger of easy detection or the
fear of punishment, probably counteract its force; and (3) the
statement was made under such conditions that if an error were
actually made it probably would have been detected and
corrected.0
The proponent of the hearsay statement bears the burden of
proving the preliminary or foundational facts necessary to satisfy
the requirements of the exception. 51 The trial court then determines
whether the proponent of the hearsay statement offered sufficient
facts to satisfy the elements of the exception for admission into
evidence. 52 Admissibility of evidence is committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed, absent an
abuse of discretion.5 The trial court abuses its discretion when it
pursues a course that represents not merely an error of judgment,
but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable, the law is not
applied, or the record demonstrates that the action is a result of
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.5 When the trial court
improperly admits evidence and permits the jury to consider it, the
47. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 595 (6th ed. 1990).
48. PACKEL & PoUuN, supra note 34, § 803 at 558; § 805 at 653.
49. Id. at 557. See also Commonwealth v. Smith, 681 A.2d at 1290 (citing JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1420 at 202-03; § 1422 at 204-05 (3d ed. 1940)).
50.
WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 1422 at 254. The dying declaration exception rests
entirely on reason (iii); i.e., the fear of divine punishment. Id.
51.
Carney v. Pennsylvania R.R., 240 A.2d 71 (Pa. 1968); Allen v. Mack, 28 A.2d 783
(Pa. 1942).
52.
PAcKEL & PouuN, supra note 34, § 803 at 558; Commonwealth v. Knable, 85 A.2d
114, 117 (Pa. 1952).
53.
Commonwealth v. Cohen, 605 A.2d 1212 (Pa. 1992).
54.
Coker v. S.M. Flickinger Co., 625 A2d 1181, 1185 (Pa 1993).
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remedy is the grant of a new trial. 55
A statement may be considered a dying declaration and,
therefore, admissible hearsay if, at the time of the statement, the
declarant believes he is going to die, death is imminent and death
actually results.5 Admissibility of a dying declaration depends on
all the surrounding circumstances, including the weapon used, the
nature and extent of the declarant's injuries, the declarant's
conduct, and his spoken words. 57 However, admissibility primarily
depends upon the declarant's state of mind.5 Two rationales justify
the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule: (1) the
necessity for the testimony of the deceased declarant; and (2) the
inherent trustworthiness of a declarant's statement when facing
death. 59
The declarant's words remain the best evidence of his belief in
impending death. 6° However, this belief may be inferred from the
circumstances, including the nature of the declarant's wounds. 61
Often, the testimony of the declarant's treating physician or of a
medical expert, regarding the fatal nature of the wounds, generally
suffices to show the declarant's expectation of impending death.6 2
The second element requires that the proponent establish the
imminence of the declarant's death. 63 It is not enough that the
declarant did, in fact, die.64 The declarant must have been dying in
fact when he made his declaration.65 Furthermore, death must
actually result6, but death need not be immediate.67 Although never
55.
A.2d 783
56.
498 A.2d
57.
58.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 568 A.2d 600 (Pa. 1989); Commonwealth v. Fortune, 346
(Pa. 1975).
Commonwealth v. Miller, 417 A.2d 128, 132 (Pa. 1980); Commonwealth v. Frederick,
1322, 1324 (Pa. 1985).
Knable, 85 A.2d at 117.
Id.

59. Commonwealth v. Riggins, 386 A2d 520 (Pa. 1978). When the declarant is
conscious of the imminence of death, the solemnity of the occasion justifies giving the dying
declaration the same weight as sworn testimony. Id. at 522. "When every hope of this world
is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most
powerful considerations to speak the truth, a situation so solemn and awful is considered by
the law as creating the most impressive of sanctions." Id. at 523 (quoting 1 WHARmN'S
CR~nNAL LAw § 669).
60. Commonwealth v. Cooley, 348 A.2d 103, 107 (Pa. 1975).
61. 'Commonwealth v. Speller, 282 A.2d 26, 28 (Pa. 1971); Commonwealth v. Plubell, 80
A.2d 825, 828 (Pa. 1951).
62. See Speller, 282 A.2d at 28; PlubeU, 80 A.2d at 829.
63. Frederick, 498 A.2d at 1324.
64.
Commonwealth v. Little, 364 A.2d 915, 918 (Pa. 1976).
65. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 314 A.2d 224, 225 (1973)).
66. Frederick, 498 A.2d at 1324.
67.
Commonwealth v. Lockett, 139 A. 836 (Pa. 1927) (declarant died ten days after
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specifically addressed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, it
appears that the declarant must have actually died as a result of his
injuries. s The court has, however, expressly held that dying
declarations are restricted to the circumstances immediately
attending the homicide and are inadmissible if they relate to former
and distinct occurrences not immediately connected with the
declarant's death.6
PART C: COMMONWEALTH V. CHAMBERLAIN:

A

PROPOSED RATIONALE

Before Chamberlain,the issue of the admissibility of a telephone
dying declaration never arose in this Commonwealth. In fact, the
vast majority of dying declaration cases involved face-to-face
declarations.70 Thus, no on-point precedent exists. The court may,
however, find instructive its holding in Commonwealth v.
Coleman,71 as well as three opinions from courts of other

jurisdictions.
First, in Coleman, the court upheld the trial court's admission of
the testimony of the decedent's mother concerning a telephone call
she received from the decedent under the present sense impression
shooting); Commonwealth v. Stickle, 398 A.2d 957 (Pa. 1979) (declarant survived for
approximately one month).
68.
PACKEL & POUuN, supra note 34, § 804.2 at 641.
69.
Commonwealth v. Perry, 73 A.2d 425, 426 (Pa. 1950).
70.
See, e.g., Knable, 85 A.2d at 116 (declarant's face-to-face dying declaration to
doctor at hospital, "Don't let her get away with it," found inadmissible, but not reversible
error); Miller, 417 A.2d at 130 (declarant's face-to-face dying declaration to police, "Clarence
Miller did this to me," found admissible); Prederick,498 A.2d at 1324 (declarant's face-to-face
dying declaration to two persons rendering declarant aid identifying defendant as person
who shot declarant found admissible); Riggins, 386 A.2d at 522 (declarant's face-to-face
dying declaration to declarant's mother and mother's co-worker identifying three assailants
who stabbed her found admissible); Cooley, 348 A.2d at 105-06 (declarant's face-to-face dying
declaration to police, "I was shot by Jim Dandy. He's back there," found admissible); Speller,
282 A.2d at 28 (declarant's face-to-face dying declaration to physician, "Big Mac shot me,"
found admissible); Plubell, 80 A.2d at 827-28 (declarant's face-to-face dying declaration to
father that declarant's wife "had got [him] this time," found admissible); Little, 364 A.2d at
918 (declarant's face to face dying declaration to police that defendant shot him found
inadmissible for failure to show declarant's awareness of impending death); Lockett, 139 A- at
838 (declarant's face-to-face dying declaration to magistrate at hospital in form of affidavit
detailing circumstances of declarant's wounds found admissible); Stickle, 398 A.2d at 962-64
(declarant's face-to-face dying declaration to police and medical personnel that defendant
beat, choked, raped, and poured gasoline over her, which ignited, found admissible). In one
case concerning a written dying declaration, the declarant first stated orally in the presence
of two persons that the defendant had shot her and then placed her mark on a written
statement. Commonwealth v. Green, 141 A. 624, 625 (Pa- 1928).
71.
326 A2d 387 (1974).
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exception to the hearsay rule. 72 In that case, the decedent-declarant
telephoned her mother.7 3 During a ten-minute conversation, the
decedent told her mother that her boyfriend (the defendant)
refused to permit her to leave the apartment they shared, that he
said he would hang up the phone and then kill her.74 During this
conversation, the mother heard the defendant shouting in the
background. 75 Five minutes after the call, the defendant, spattered
with blood and lacerated about the face, hailed a police car and
stated that he hurt his girlfriend. 76 Five minutes later, the police
found the decedent in the apartment dead of multiple stab
wounds. 77 In upholding the admission of this hearsay testimony
under the present sense impression exception, the court found that
the confluence of time and events vested special reliability in the
statements.78 The court further found that the facts and the
defendant's admission that he argued with the decedent prior to the
telephone call corroborated the mother's hearsay testimony.79
Second, in State of Louisiana v. Martin, the Court of Appeals of
Louisiana upheld the admission of a 911 recording as an excited
utterance, "if not a true dying declaration."80 In that case, the
decedent telephoned 911 after the defendant allegedly set him on
fire. 81 During the course of the decedent's recorded conversation
with the 911 emergency operator, the decedent identified the
defendant as the person who set him on fire.8 2
Third, in People v. Leonard, the Supreme Court of Illinois upheld
the trial court's admission of a telephone hearsay statement under
the spontaneous statement exception.8 In Leonard, the decedent
72.
Commonwealth v. Coleman, 326 A.2d 387 (1974). The present sense impression
exception to the hearsay rule includes those declarations concerning conditions or
non-exciting events that the declarant observes at the time of his declaration. Coleman, 326
A.2d at 389 (citing Morgan, Res Gestae, 12 WASH. L REv. 91, 96 (1937)). The declaration's
relative immediacy guarantees the indicium of reliability because the declarant has little
opportunity to reflect upon or calculate a misstatement. Coleman, 326 A.2d at 389.
73. Coleman, 362 A.2d at 390.
74. Id. at 388.
75. Id. at 390.
76. Id. at 388.
77. Id.
78. Coleman, 362 A.2d at 390.
79. Id.
80.
State of Louisiana v. Martin, 562 So.2d 468 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1990).
81. Martin, 562 So.2d at 471.
82.
Id.
83. People v. Leonard, 415 N.E.2d 358 (Ill. 1980). Illinois' spontaneous statement
exception requires some evidence of an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a
spontaneous unreflecting statement. Leonard, 416 N.E.2d at 418 (citing People v. Poland, 174
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placed a telephone call to the testifying witness and identified
himself 84 During the course of their conversation, the decedent
stated, "He's got a gun."84 The witness then heard another voice
state, "Tell the mother f-manager to come down now, now, now."8 6
She recognized the other voice as that of the defendant.8 7 The
witness then hung up the phone and called the police.8 8 The victim
died of a close-range gunshot wound to the chest.8 9 Three other
witnesses corroborated the hearsay testimony by testifying that
they saw the decedent and the defendant struggle over a gun at a
time that was virtually contemporaneous with the telephone call9 0
Accordingly, the court held that sufficient circumstantial evidence
was presented corroborating a sufficiently startling event to admit
the testimony under the spontaneous statement exception to the
hearsay rule.9 1
Finally, in State v. Flesher, the Court of Appeals of Iowa upheld
the admission of a telephone declaration under its present sense
impression exception to the hearsay rule.92 In that case, the
witness-husband was engaged in a conversation with his
decedent-wife when he heard a knock at the door.93 The wife
answered the door.94 She then returned to the telephone
conversation and told her husband that the defendant was at the
door and that she had let her in.9 5 This evidence placed the
96
defendant at the murder scene.
The common thread linking the facts of Coleman, Martin,
Leonard, and Flesher (and, therefore, justifying their evidentiary
holdings) is the undisputed presence of a sufficient guarantee of
trustworthiness, in that no question existed as to whether the
decedent in each case was, in fact, the declarant. The
N.E.2d 804 (I1. 1961)).
84. Leonard, 415 N.E.2d at 360.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Leonard, 415 N.E.2d at 361.
90. Id. at 362.
91. Id.
92. State v. Flesher, 286 N.W.2d 215 (Iowa Ct. App. 1979). Iowa holds that a statement
describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the
event or condition or immediately thereafter is admissible under the present sense
impression exception to the hearsay rule. FResher, 286 N.W.2d at 216-18.
93. Id. at 216.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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distinguishing fact present in those cases, and lacking in
Chamberlain, is that the declarants spoke with the testifying
witnesses; these conversations sufficiently guaranteed the
trustworthiness of the callers' identities. As such, the Coleman,
Martin, Leonard, and F/esher courts properly proceeded to analyze
whether the facts satisfied the requirements of the particular
hearsay exception advanced by the proponent. Although each
hearsay exception contains different preliminary or foundational
facts necessary to satisfy its elements, courts cannot lose sight of
the underlying reasons for the hearsay exceptions. In the instant
case, certainly, Sherri Chamberlain is dead and, therefore,
unavailable. However, the facts must demonstrate that the
circumstances attendant to the hearsay statement provide sufficient
guarantees of trustworthiness that Sherri Chamberlain, in fact,
placed the call.
In deciding this issue, the court must look to the attendant
circumstances. First, the call roused Kim Ulrich from her sleep at
2:24 am. and lasted only 2.5 seconds. 97 The timing of the call and
its short duration raise the issue of whether Mrs. Ulrich was
sufficiently coherent to have been certain as to the caller's identity.
Second, Kim Ulrich engaged in no conversation with the caller.
This fact also goes against positive identification. Third, the caller
failed to respond to Mrs. Ulrich's queries of "Sherri?"98 Again, this
fact weighs against certainty of identification. Fourth, during this
2.5 second call, Mrs. Ulrich heard no background noises. 9 If, for
example, Mrs. Ulrich heard Gregory Inman speak in the
background, this fact would probably be enough to corroborate the
declarant's identity because both victims were found dead at the
same residence. Lack of background noises, therefore, further
clouds the identification issue. Fifth, the coroner destroyed any
corroborative evidence that could have been obtained from the
victims' telephone redial function when the coroner used the
telephone. 1°° Sixth, although the handset of the telephone was
found lying next to Sherri Chamberlain's body, 101 it is possible that
she merely attempted to place a call before her death or that the
killer planted the telephone next to her body.
Conversely, Mrs. Ulrich testified that she engaged in at least 100
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Chamberlain, No. 155 (E.D. Pa.) (1997), Brief for Appellant at 14, 23.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 16.
Chamberlain,Brief for Appellee at 7-8.
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conversations with Sherri Chamberlain and recognized her voice.10 2
Moreover, approximately three minutes following the call, Sherri
Chamberlain was found shot to death.' °3
Based on these facts, it is questionable whether the declarant
was, in fact, Sherri Chamberlain. If the court finds that the facts
fail to provide sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness as to
identity, it should not proceed to analyze whether the statement
satisfies the elements of a dying declaration.' °4 Conversely, if the
court finds that sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness of identity
exist, it must then reach the ultimate question of whether the
10 5
statement meets the elements of the dying declaration.
PART D. THE ULTIMATE QUESTION: WHETHER A TELEPHONE DYING
DECLARATION CAN EVER, OR SHOULD EVER, RISE TO THE LEVEL OF
TRUSTWORTHINESS THAT THE COURT DEEMS NECESSARY FOR ADMISSION
INTO EVIDENCE?

The Chamberlain case begs the important question of whether a
telephone dying declaration can ever, or should ever, rise to the
level of trustworthiness inherently necessary for admission into
evidence. Assume that Sherri Chamberlain answered Mrs. Ulrich's
queries of, "Sherri?" Clearly, trustworthiness as to the caller's
identity would no longer be an issue and the court could properly
proceed to determine whether the proponent proved the
preliminary facts necessary to satisfy the elements of a dying
declaration. The question then becomes: can the statement, or
should the statement, be admissible under this exception?
First, did the words, "Call an ambulance - Terry shot Greg and
me," demonstrate that the declarant believed she was going to die?
Preliminarily, one may argue that a person facing death and in dire
need of medical treatment would call an emergency unit, not a
friend. Furthermore, it may be argued that the words, "Call an
ambulance," evidence a belief in the necessity of medical treatment
and the hope of recovery.
Conversely, one may argue that because the court holds that the
102. Id. at 7.
103. Id.
104. This finding would also disqualify the statement under the excited utterance
exception to the hearsay rule.
105.
If the court finds that the statement is trustworthy as to identity, it follows that
the statement would be admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay
nile.
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declarant's belief in imminent death may be inferred from the
circumstances, the nature of Sherri Chamberlain's wounds satisfy
the requirement. 1 6 Moreover, many statements, including "Don't let
her get away with it,"07 "Clarence Miller did this to me,"'08 "I was
shot by Jim Dandy. He's back there,"'09 and "Big Mac shot me,"110
have been upheld as dying declarations even though the words
themselves demonstrated no belief in imminent death. The
important differences between those statements and the statement
at issue, however, are: (1) the declarants made the statements
face-to-face with the testifying witnesses; and (2) the testifying
witnesses observed the nature and extent of the declarants'
injuries. Accordingly, the surrounding circumstances justified the
conclusion that each declarant believed in imminent death because
the testifying witness observed the gravity of the wounds and the
declarant's conduct and demeanor as he spoke.
In the instant case, Mrs. Ulrich never saw Sherri Chamberlain
when she spoke the words, "Call an ambulance - Terry shot Greg
and me." How, then, can one reasonably infer the declarant's belief
in impending death at the precise time the declarant spoke the
words? Admissibility of a dying declaration primarily depends on
the declarant's state of mind.1 1 Without words conveying state of
mind and without observation by the testifying witness sufficient to
infer state of mind, how can this telephone dying declaration, or
any other, ever satisfy the elements of belief in impending death
and imminence of death?
Moreover, in Chamberlain, the Commonwealth's medical expert
testified that Sherri Chamberlain sustained five gunshot wounds,
including a grazing scalp wound, a chest wound, a shoulder wound,
an abdominal wound and a head wound. 12 The expert also testified
that the head wound was immediately fatal and that the chest
wound would have killed Sherri Chamberlain within a few seconds
13
to several minutes, at most.'
Based on the medical testimony, the following scenario seems
probable: Sherri Chamberlain first sustained one or more non-fatal
106.

See Commonwealth v. Speller, 282 A.2d 26; Commonwealth v. Plubell, 80 A.2d

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Knable, 85 A.2d at 116.
Miller, 417 A.2d at 130.
Cooley, 348 A.2d at 105-06.
Speller, 282 A-2d at 28.
Knable, 85 A.2d at 117.
Chamberlain,Brief for Appellee at 9.
Chamberlain,Brief for Appellant at 21 and n.l.
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wounds. The killer then left the room, giving her the opportunity to
use the telephone. At this time, Sherri Chamberlain placed the call
to Kim Ulrich. The killer then returned and inflicted the remaining
shots, including the fatal shots to the chest and heart. Under this
scenario, it is likely that Sherri Chamberlain did not believe that
death was imminent because the shoulder wound inflicted at the
precise time she placed the call is arguably not fatal. Therefore, the
elements of a dying declaration could not be met.
The untrustworthy circumstances surrounding a telephone dying
declaration give rise to another scenario. Assume that Carl wants
to kill Victoria. Carl knows that Victoria and her estranged
husband, Ian, are going through a less-than-civil divorce. Carl
craftily plots to kill Victoria on the date the court is to enter the
couple's divorce decree in order to implicate Ian. Carl enters
Victoria's home and shoots her once in the leg. He then forces
Victoria to telephone her friend and state that Ian shot her. After
the call, Carl fires the fatal shot.
One may argue that the factual issues raised in the above
scenarios are properly resolved by a jury and defense counsel can
address these issues and create reasonable doubt. However, it
remains well-settled that before a dying declaration may be
presented to a jury, the trial court must first determine whether its
proponent offered sufficient preliminary or foundation facts
necessary to satisfy its elements. 114 Even if the Chamberlain court
concludes that Sherri Chamberlain placed the call to Kim Ulrich, it
nevertheless seems improbable that the elements of a dying
declaration can be, or should be, met under the facts presented. 11 5
The words, "Call an ambulance - Terry shot Greg and me," spoken
over the telephone are insufficient to show the declarant's belief in
imminent death at the precise time the statement was made
because the testifying witness had no opportunity to view the
extent of the declarant's wounds. In fact, no one knows the precise
order in which the shots were inflicted. Thus, the fact that Sherri
Chamberlain did, in fact, die does not mean that she was dying in
fact when she made the declaration. Moreover, the testifying
witness' lack of observation renders the statement insufficient to
support the imminence of death element because, again, the extent
of the injuries was uncertain at the time the declarant spoke the
114.
Commonwealth v. Miller, 417 A.2d 128, 135 (Pa. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1113
(1981); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 244 A.2d 683, 685 (Pa. 1983).
115.
If the court concludes that Sherri Chamberlain placed the call, the statement
could be admitted under the excited utterance exception.
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words. In order to qualify as a dying declaration, the declarant
must have been dying in fact when she placed the call. Without a
witness who observed the extent of the wounds when the
statement was made, how can this element ever be satisfied?
Certainly, Sherri Chamberlain died, but whether she was dying in
fact when she made the statement will never be known.
Conversely, if the declarant expressed a belief in imminent death or
described the extent of her wounds at the time she made the
statement, then the statement could be, and probably should be,
admissible.
Can, or should, a telephone dying declaration ever rise to the
level of trustworthiness inherently necessary for admission into
evidence? Yes, provided that no question exists as to the identity of
the caller, the declarant speaks words sufficient to show a belief in
imnninent death and conveys words to demonstrate she was dying
in fact when she made the declaration. However, due to the high
standard that must be met to guarantee the trustworthiness of a
telephone dying declaration, it seems unlikely that many, if any,
factual situations could rise to the level of reliability inherently
necessary for admission into evidence.
We will never know whether Sherri Chamberlain placed the call
to Kim Ulrich on the night of her murder. It is yet to be seen
whether the supreme court will uphold the admissibility of the
telephone dying declaration at issue in Chamberlain. What is
certain, however, is that if the court upholds this telephone dying
declaration, it simultaneously opens a dangerous Pandora's box at
the close of the twentieth century's high-technology communication
boom that undoubtedly will include the admissibility of the dying
declarations transmitted via electronic mail, Internet chat room,
and fax machine.1 1 6 Such a decision becomes even more frightening
as high-technology communication marches on into the twenty-first
century.
Sherri K Adelkoff

116.
The May 1, 1998 arrest of Larry Froistad illustrates the rising impact of
high-technology communication on evidentiary issues. The State of North Dakota charged
Mr. Froistad with the 1995 murder of his daughter on the basis of confessions he allegedly
sent via electronic mail to various members of his online alcoholism support group. See
<www.ABCNEWS.com>, May 1, 1998; PrsBURGH TRIBUNE-REvIEw, May 2, 1998, at A6. The
defense maintains that the electronic mail messages are inadmissible because they could
have been sent by someone other than Mr. Froistad. <www.ABCNEWS.com>. As of the date
of completion of this Comment, this author is unaware of any further developments in the
Froistad case.

